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Affirmative Action
Problems and
Prospects
by
James Farmer
We live in complicated times today, and one of the
sparks that flies off from such complicated times involv-
ing difficult issues is that words have all kinds of mean-
ings, and they tend to confuse. I was astonished to hear
our president, Ronald Reagan, say that if Dr. King were
alive he would agree with him in opposing affirmative ac-
tion, because King was color-blind and so is Ronald Rea-
gan. This was a stopper, really, a real stopper. It reminded
me of the lady who had inherited several million dollars,
and because of her good fortune, she quickly engaged a
historian to do the story of her family tree. The historian
went right to work, did his research, returned shortly to
the woman and said, "Lady, I have some bad news for
you. I have run into complications. I have discovered that
one of your grandfathers was electrocuted at Sing-Sing."
She said, "Oh, that's horrible, but you are a historian;
you're a scholar. Just cover that up — you know— conceal
it so that it cannot be recognized by the reader. So the
good doctor went back to his study for further labor. A
week later he returned to the woman and read her the fol-
lowing paragraph concerning her errant grandfather:
"One of her grandfathers occupied the chair of applied
electricity at one of America's well-known institutions.
He was very much attached to that position and he died in
the harness."
Well, I usually run into that kind of confusion over
words. Affirmative action has had an interesting history.
I, with no attempted modesty, claim to have proposed the
idea to Lyndon Johnson, in either late 1962 or early 1963,
when he was Vice President. (The only person I know of
who would disagree with me on that is the late Whitney
Young, and he is not present to voice his disagreement
now). When I reported to the Council on United Civil
Rights Leadership, that group that was called the "Big
Six" or the "Big Four" by the media, that I had had such
a meeting with Vice President Lyndon Johnson and had
proposed this idea, to which he gave the name "affirma-
tive action," Whitney said, "Well, I discussed the same
idea with Jack Kennedy." So perhaps we, in contemplat-
ing the same set of facts, had reached the same conclusion
that something new was needed to deal with the terrible
job situation that minorities found themselves in. We
were making progress, it is true. Blacks were getting better
jobs; black income was increasing but that was in abso-
lute terms, not in relative terms. We were not closing the
gap. As we (blacks) rose, the majority rose faster; the gap
widened, and so we had to do something else. Well, that
was one indication of the complex days in which we were
entering then.
The simple days were in the early '60's, when the issues
were hot dogs at the lunch counter, cups of coffee, front
seats of the bus, being able to check into a hotel, eat in a
fancy restaurant in Birmingham, Jackson, Montgomery
or New Orleans. That was so simple. It separated the
sheep from the goats, good from evil, right from wrong.
When those four black college freshmen from North Car-
olina A & T College sat in at the lunch counter at Wool-
worth in Greensboro February 1, 1960, and asked for cof-
fee, it was very simple. Anybody with any decency, any
place in the world, would have argued that of course they
should have that coffee if they had the money to pay for it.
They were not dirty; they were not drunk; they were not
boisterous; they were not creating any disturbance what-
soever. Anybody who said that they should not have been
served the coffee had to be a racist. This separated good
from evil, separated right from wrong— it was so simple
in those days. And furthermore, you could tell at that
time when you were winning a battle: if they got the cof-
fee, they had won; if they did not get the coffee, then vic-
tory had at least been deferred if not completely lost.
The same was true with the front seat of the bus. If they
sat on the front seat of the bus and were not brutalized or
savaged, were not jailed or thrown off, then they had won,
and anybody of any decency would have agreed that they
should have been allowed to sit whereever they wanted to
sit. They had paid the same fare that other passengers had
paid, and if the bus was going where they had intended to
go, and they were creating no disturbance, then they
should sit where they wished on a first-come first-served
basis. So that was simple. If they sat there, they had won.
That's the way it was in the '60's.
Sometimes you become nostalgic for the simplicity of
that time and when the youths of that day were shouting
our slogan — ah, how well you must remember it: "Free-
dom now!" The youths believed that freedom would come
by Monday morning if they did certain things: if they
went to jail, if they blocked bulldozers or climbed cranes;
if their heads were battered in the South, then somehow
by mystic means, freedom would come. Those were the
simple days, and we kind of looked for simple answers.
Well, we expected answers that were far too simple; they
turned out not to be that simple. We won the victories, the
short-term victories we sought. We got the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and we got the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
But before those victories came, many of us realized that
they were short term, not long term, and that the time
would come when many of our folk would have the right
to sit on the front seat of the bus or buy a hot dog at a
lunch counter but would not be able to pay for it or buy
the ticket, and that would turn out to be a dirt victory!
So in the meeting with Johnson (he was Vice President
and Chairman of President Kennedy's Commission on
Equal Employment Opportunity), which a committee of
the Congress of Racial Equality had requested, I told the
Vice President that we had been studying statistics which
showed that while we were moving ahead in some senses—
and blacks were getting better jobs, getting promoted,
being hired into some non-traditional jobs in small num-
bers, smaller than we had hoped for— we were not closing
the gap. The income gap remained as large, and indeed
was widening a bit. And he said, "Yes, I've seen the same
statistics; I am just as upset about them as you are, but
what do you suggest we do?"
Well, we in CORE had discussed it at some length. We
had had what we called bull-sessions about it and had
come up with an idea; the idea was suggested by one of my
staff, and not by me. He suggested that the back wheels of
the car are not going to catch the front wheels of the car
as long as they are moving at the same rate of speed. So
those back wheels somehow have got to be speeded up if
they are going to catch the front wheels of the car. As long
as minorities — black people particularly— and that was
the major concern at that time, (our sights broadened
later on as we went along), but as long as blacks were the
built-in rear wheels of the car, we would continue to be a
gap behind others. And so, what we had to do was to
speed up the progress of the rear wheels.
I said to Johnson that the concept is not really different
from the concept of veterans preference. The idea here is
that when those young men go into the armed services,
they have been outside of the economic mainstream of
the nation's life for whatever period of time, a year, two
years, three years; so upon reentering civilian life they are
at a disadvantage. We have to give them a shove to help
them back into the mainstream, to help them catch up.
Therefore, veterans receive preference in civil service
exams and other things: if you are a veteran then you get
higher on that list. And I said blacks have been out of the
mainstream forever; they had never been in it. So we need
an even bigger boost to get us into that mainstream which
we had never yet experienced. He nodded his head -and
narrowed his eyes, so I went on to say what we are propos-
ing is something that we call — this is a terrible term,
"compensatory preferential treatment." Johnson winced.
He said, "great idea because we got to do something like
that."
Then he used another analogy. He said, "If two men are
running a race and one of them has a ball and chain right
around his ankle, and he is there at the starting line fuss-
ing with that ball and chain while his opponent is half way
around the track running like mad, you can't cut those
chains off and say, 'now you're free, you're free and equal,
run the race.' That's not fair," said Johnson. "That's not
fair; the other man's half way around the track. Somehow
we got to start them at the same place or get this fellow up
where he can catch up with the other man, then say run
the race as equals." He said, "But don't call it . . . what
did you call it? Compensatory what?" And he said, "Oh,
that's awful; that's calculated to raise a hackle on every-
body—get everybody mad at you." He said, "No, what
you're going to call it — let's see — we got to move forward,
we got to move forthrightly, be positive about it, move
positively, move affirmatively . . . yes, that's it — 'Affir-
mative Action'! "
Well, he made a speech at Howard University using his
analogy of the runners. Affirmative action became offi-
cial policy of the Federal Government. Then shortly after
that, they told a story about President Kennedy stepping
off a plane one day, looking at the Honor Guard there to
meet him, and observing that there were no blacks there.
He called the officer over and commented on that fact.
The officer smiled and said, "That's correct, Mr. Presi-
dent; you see, none have applied." The President said
"Well go out and find some." That was affirmative action.
That flew in the face of the old concept of color-blind-
ness. What we had been saying to employers and to other
decision makers in the society, including educational ad-
ministrators in institutions of higher education, was "Be
color-blind, be absolutely color-blind, don't see color
when you see an applicant for a job or admission. Just
hire the best qualified person who happens to apply for
that job. That's all; that's all you need to do; you will ful-
fill your duty, fulfill all the requirements. And do not dis-
criminate; do not refuse to hire or admit anybody because
of his or her color." That's all we asked of them; we asked
them to be color-blind.
Well, that color-blindness really did not work. We
longed for color-blindness. I remember in the early days
of CORE— and there are very few people here old enough
to remember 1942 when we were organizing CORE in
Chicago — the white CORE members who were as dedi-
cated as I, more dedicated if that were possible, believed
passionately in color-blindness.
I remember Bernice Fisher, who was one of the found-
ers of CORE. She was a good friend of mine. We would
get together and argue and debate the ideas that went into
the formation of CORE, and she talked about color-
blindness. She would tell herself and tell all of us the story
which everybody has heard, about the kid in first grade
who came home one day— he was a white kid — and told
his mother about this wonderful new friend he had in
school in the first grade. He came home the next day talk-
ing about this marvelous new friend. The mother said,
"Well where does he live?" "He doesn't live around here;
he doesn't live around us; he lives a long way from here."
And the next day he talked about the friend again. The
mother asked him rather suspiciously, "Is your friend a
Negro?" The boy looked up and thought, "Gosh, I don't
know, I forgot to look." He said, "I'll look tomorrow and
let you know." We told ourselves that story over and over
again. How Bernice laughed and how all of us laughed.
We told ourselves that that's the way we were: we were
color-blind; the nation was going to become color-blind;
we were going to make it color-blind. And so what we
were saying to employers prior to affirmative action was,
"be color-blind."
Indeed, the first Fair Employment Practices legislation
was color-blind legislation. There was that executive or-
der extracted from Franklin Delano Roosevelt by the late
great A. Phillip Randolph, who was, in my judgment, one
of the greatest black leaders this nation has produced.
(Many here who would not recognize his name, would say,
"A. Phillip who?") Randolph had proposed a march on
Washington way back in 1941, before Pearl Harbor. It was
to take place early that year and he, in his thundering
voice, held mass meetings at parks throughout the
country and he packed them in. He was the premier black
leader those days. Randolph said, "In my opinion dis-
crimination in employment, in government or industry,
will not cease until the President and the Congress of the
United States see 5,000, 10,000, 25,000 (petitioners)." Big
terms then, unprecedentally big terms and when it caught
fire, people applauded so much Randolph pursued the
idea of the march in his speeches. He got the backing of
the Walter White of the NAACP and Lester Granger of
the Urban League, and continued to talk about it. Roose-
velt was upset because America was the arsenal of democ-
racy. We were defending democracy and freedom against
tyrants, fighting against the master race theory of Adolph
Hitler and against fascist Italy. And if the whole world
saw 25,000 black Americans coming as close to the lawn
of the White House as they could get, probably protesting
discrimination in employment in defense industries as
well as the government of this arsenal of democracy, how
embarrassing that would be!
Roosevelt, of course, was upset. Eleanor Roosevelt
made a trip to New York, met with Randolph and Walter
White and Lester Granger and asked them what they
wanted her to do to facilitate the matter. They wanted a
meeting with the President, face to face. The meeting was
set up by Eleanor. At the meeting Roosevelt said, "Gentle-
men, you must not march on Washington; you cannot do
it." "What, Mr. President," asked Randolph, "would you
be prepared to do to persuade us to call off our plans?"
"What do you wish me to do, Mr. Randolph?" "We want
an executive order outlawing discrimination in employ-
ment in government and industry on grounds of race,
creed, color or national origin." Said the President, "You
shall have it." That was Executive Order 8802; it set up the
first Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) to
oversee it.
Various states passed FEPC laws after that. They were
color-blind (laws); the laws said to employers: be color-
blind, be oblivious to race, to color, to nationality for any-
one who applies; just hire the best qualified. Now this
assumed — which we were not really conscious of at the
time — a color-blind society in order for it to work. It as-
sumed that the employer would act in good faith; it as-
sumed, too, that blacks would apply in reasonable num-
bers, feeling confident that they would have the same
chance as anyone else to get the job. It assumed that they
would know about the job, that it would be publicized
through media which reached them as well as it reached
others at the time. Well, it didn't work. We'd go back to an
employer after a while and say, "Now Mr. Employer, you
had a year of Fair Employment Practices Commission ac-
tivity, how many blacks did you hire?" His answer would
be: "How the hell should I know, I'm color-blind like you
told me to be." We'd take a visual check and find out he
had none. He'd say, "So what, have you proved that I re-
fused to hire somebody who was better qualified than
those whom I hired. If not, you have no complaint — dry
up." Obviously it wasn't working.
One other illustration. CORE in the early 1960's had a
campaign against job discrimination in a chain of ham-
burger joints in the Bronx—White Tower or White Cas-
tles, something like that — at which the only blacks and
Puerto Ricans that they employed were janitors in the
janitorial service. We had investigated carefully; we tried
to negotiate. They said, "we have nothing to talk about
with you." So we picketed. This wasn't in Birmingham; it
was in the Bronx, and we had garbage thrown at us, a
cross was burned in the window. We continued picketing.
We persevered.
Finally, management sat down to talk and what the
manager said to me was, "Mr. Farmer, you are absolutely
right. You have pointed out in your leaflets that the only
blacks and Puerto Ricans in our employ are in the janitor-
ial service. That is correct." He said, "We would like to
correct it, but we can't because we project that we will
have need for about 75 sales personnel within the next 60
days, (sales personnel were counter people), and we would
like to hire blacks and Puerto Ricans to make up for the
deficit of the present and past, but we can't do it." "Why
can't you," I asked. The manager smiled and said, "Be-
cause it would be against the law. We are told by the law to
be color-blind and if we get our employees from the State
Employment Service and ask them to send us 75 black
and Puerto Rican applicants, they will immediately
charge us with violating the State Fair Employment Prac-
tices Law which says that we may not consider race or
color in seeking job applicants or workers." So he
smiled — rather triumphantly, I thought.
I asked for a recess and called a buddy of mine who
works for the State Employment Service and said, "Jack,
you realize the law is archaic." He said, "Of course, it's
one of those color-blind laws that you and a lot of people
like you fought so hard to get a few years ago." I explained
the problem we had with this chain of hamburger joints
and asked for his suggestion. He said, "Well I'll tell you
what Jim, go back into your negotiations and ask this
manager to call me. Tell him don't write but call and tell
me of his needs within 60 days — 75 people and he would
like blacks and Puerto Ricans. Tell him to tell me that over
the phone and I will then call our office on 125th Street in
Harlem and ask them to send him 75 qualified applicants
regardless of race, color, creed or national origin."
Well, here was a recognition that the law was out-
moded — the color-blind law and our seeking to find some
way around it. Well, obviously, that's not the way to oper-
ate in a society that respects law. We had to find some-
thing new. What was new, then, was affirmative action,
which flew in the face of the concept of equal treatment.
We were asking for something more than equal treatment
for those of unequal status. Now after my meeting with
Johnson, when I reported on this to the Council on
United Civil Rights Leadership, there was no unanimity
of approval there. Roy Wilkins, who was a good friend of
mine and a man whom I respected highly, (I think he was
one of the brightest of the Civil Rights Leaders), raised
some questions about it. He said, "Jim, I don't think it
would fly in America. I don't think it would fly because
here you are moving a step beyond asking for equal treat-
ment; you are asking for special treatment, by whatever
name you call it." And he says, "Americans will buy equal
treatment but will not buy special treatment." I argued
that asking for equal treatment for those of unequal
status would not remove the inequality. Wilkins said,
"That may be true, but I am still not prepared to buy your
alternative as a workable plan." There were others who
disagreed later on, others whose names would be recog-
nizable, who felt that this just would not go in America.
After it became a Federal policy, the Government be-
gan using it in its contracts with industry, requiring that
industry report on the number of minorities in various
job categories. If there was inequity, the industry was re-
quired to show improvement each year at the risk of pos-
sible loss of the contract. This became a policy of the Fed-
eral Government. Now it did work hardship on people.
There is just no question about it, and I could understand
it. I am not one of those who feels that anybody who dis-
agrees with us on the intricacies of affirmative action is
automatically, ipso facto, a racist. It is not true; things are
not simple as they were in the '60's.
Affirmative action didn't work the first couple of
years, by the way. We'd go back to an employer then and
say: "Look, you've been practicing affirmative action for
two years and that said you had to go out and seek mem-
bers of minorities to fill jobs. How many minorities do
you have now?" What was the answer? In more cases than
not, the answer was, "Well Jim, God knows I've tried; I've
tried hard but I couldn't find any that were qualified."
Then we had another problem. Alright, we got affirma-
tive action, moving a step forward, beyond equal treat-
ment but still, this doesn't work. How are we going to
prove whether this man, this woman— probably a man
then because of the discrimination against women, (there
were very few women who were in those decision making
spots at that time). How are we going to prove that this
man has tried honestly? How are we going to prove that
he has acted in good faith and could not find a qualified
person?
Well, we, by "we" I mean the Movement, came up with
the idea of numerical goals and timetables, someway to
test a man's good faith. He says, "I've tried." We would
say "Look, you've tried but you're gonna have to try
harder because you have a goal here and this is a goal that
you are going to have to move toward." Not a quota, we
argued, because a quota is hard and fixed, inflexible; a
goal is something that you move toward, must show prog-
ress toward. The supervisors, the line managers, those
who hire, fire and promote, will prove their efficiency by
meeting the other criteria which the company has estab-
lished, and this one additional criterion: how well they
have pursued the goal of the affirmative action. We are
not asking, of course, that unqualified people apply or be
hired. Oh, no, no, just know that they are qualified to be
hired, and then hire them.
Now we are being told that yes, but affirmative action
has done so much damage it has made people lazy. Well,
for all of these years, white males have had affirmative ac-
tion; they have had preferential treatment. I haven't no-
ticed that it has made most of them lazy; they seem pretty
aggressive and moving ahead, in spite of having had pref-
erential treatment, having had affirmative action. I don't
think affirmative action makes people lazy. It happens to
have quite the opposite effect. Now it is quite possible
that some persons of less than adequate qualifications
have slipped through, but that's true in any system that is
established. I don't know any system that is fool-proof
and has not made an error. But the system itself, the affir-
mative action system, has been good.
But then, what about the argument of quotas? What
about it? For years we fought against quotas. Quotas were
used in university after university, professional school
after professional school, to exclude or limit the number
of various minorities: blacks, Hispanics, Jews — and we
fought hard. I know. When I was living in New York City,
many, many years during that period, we fought in New
York State against those institutions' quotas. We fought
to have those quotas removed and we won the battle. We
got those quotas licked. As far as I know, they're out.
They had quotas too. Usually they didn't deny it or
couldn't deny it. They wouldn't say they had a quota
against Jews; they would say they had quotas on New
Yorkers because they didn't want to be swamped with peo-
ple from New York, but everybody knew what they
meant: they had a quota on Jews, and we fought against
it.
So you see, now it's difficult for many people to see.
When we turn around, the agendas have changed. Time
has moved on, and in order to make additional progress,
it is perceived as necessary to have something similar to
quotas. In spite of the argument which I made, it's not a
quota; the differences are clear; it's similar to quotas.
Those who say it is a quota— I wouldn't argue too hard
with them on it. We use something like quotas to make
further progress. "Quotas were bad then, and they are bad
now," they would argue. It is hard for some people to see
that they may be useful now when they were wrong then.
They were wrong when they were used to exclude; now
they can be used to include those who have been excluded.
Some great thinkers and people of warm, great, big
hearts have been unable to agree with that. To name just
one, the Late Justice William O. Douglas, great old war-
horse with all progressive causes. But in the DeFunis case
which preceded Bakke by some years, DeFunis had ap-
plied for admission to the law school at the University of
Washington State and had been turned down. He took it
to court. He finally got it to the Supreme Court, arguing
as Bakke had that he was turned down because they had a
quota for blacks, and blacks were admitted who were less
qualified than he; therefore, he was discriminated against
because of his color, white. When it got to the Supreme
Court, DeFunis has already been admitted to law school
at the University of Washington, and in fact had gradu-
ated, it took so long. So the Supreme Court was able to
sidestep the substantive issue by ruling it a moot case. But
Justice Douglas felt so strongly on this issue that he sat
down and wrote a decision of his own, an opinion which
was classic liberalism of two decades earlier, New Deal
liberalism which had to view any use of quotas as wrong
because it viewed the fight against quotas as a principle,
not a tactic. It was a beautifully worded opinion; it would
have been a classic document in my opinion had it been
written two decades earlier. But written when it was, in my
judgment, it was archaic and obsolete. "For time makes
ancient good uncouth," to quote an old poem and a
hymn.
The fight against quotas was never an absolute, never a
matter of principle, but a matter of tactic. It was not a
quota that was bad; it was how the quota was used. If it's
used to keep people out — it's bad; if it's used to bring peo-
ple in, then it is good. Yet there are so many emotions
around, how can we keep it a live concept and keep it go-
ing? I raised that question a number of years ago with a
group of management interns in a government depart-
ment (Defense Department). These were college students.
One very bright college student, a management intern at
the Department Of Defense, came up with an idea. Imagi-
native, not without flaws but imaginative, and that's what
it's going to take today, I think: compromise, dialogue,
negotiation, use of imagination to find some alterations
that are more widely acceptable. He said, "Just a minute
Mr. Farmer, let's take the University of Washington and
DeFunis." He said, "O.K., we can say that two applicants
are highly qualified; A and B are highly qualified." I
doubt that we can say A is more qualified than B because
A scored 5 points higher than B on a test, but we can say
that both are qualified; maybe B speaks better, maybe B
improvises more with his clients; maybe B can wheel and
deal better with the Honorable Judge in his cloak-room,
but we can say that A and B are both qualified. Suppose
the University of Washington Law School had had space
for 100 applicants; suppose then they had selected 1,000
of the best qualified applicants during all the criteria, and
then suppose they would select the 100 they needed out of
that 1,000 by random selection, a lottery". He said, "Now
if DeFunis were in the 1,000 and not in the 100, could he
then claim discrimination in reverse? I doubt it," said this
management intern.
I thought it was a very imaginative suggestion, not
without flaws, because the crux of the matter is how to
select the 1,000 or what the criteria are or the assumption
is. And it is an assumption, that if you pick 1,000 there
will be representative sprinklings of minorities and of
women, and so on. Maybe there won't be. We are suppos-
ing only that DeFunis is not in that thousand. But sup-
pose no blacks are in it; then blacks couldn't claim dis-
crimination either, could they? And we wouldn't accept
that as a substitute for affirmative action. So it's not un-
flawed, but maybe we are going to have to sit down and
work out some way that we can win back some of the al-
lies who have been lost in the struggle.
I think the basic principle of affirmative action must
not be lost. It is not true, Mr. President, Mr. Ronald Rea-
gan, that Martin Luther King would have agreed with you
that affirmative action should go, or that numerical goals
and time tables, if that is what you're saying, should go.
Remember that Dr. King spoke of the color-blind society
where a black child and a white child hold hands, play to-
gether as brothers, and where a person would be judged
not by the color of skin but by the content of character.
He put that in the form of a dream, of the future, a future
nation. He rocked back on his heels and said "I have a
dream that one day." It was a dream of a nation to come,
of a nation that we would bring about, not a nation that
exists. You do not bring that dream about, you do not cre-
ate equality by deceiving yourself into thinking that it is
already here. In India they wrote affirmative action into
their constitution in the '50's when the nation was formed
after independence from Britain; This was affirmative ac-
tion to help the outcasts, the untouchables, to move them
up. I said, "Well, how did you come to the conclusion that
that was necessary?" They said, "It's elementary, Brother
Farmer, it is elementary. You do not achieve equality for
those of unequal status by treating them equally. You can-
not treat -those of unequal status equally and hope to
achieve equality of status." So true. India accepted that as
a foregone conclusion, something that should not indeed
be questioned. But is is being questioned here, now, and it
will be questioned even more.
Frankly, I do not believe in deceiving ourselves at all. I
think we would probably lose a referendum on affirma-
tive action with numerical goals and timetables in any
community in the country, and in any city in the country
except the city that's predominantly black. We would win
it in Washington, DC; we'd win it in — what's the town in
Mississippi — all black? Mount Bayou. We'd win it there.
I think we would lose it in Boston; we'd lose it in Chicago;
we'd lose it in New York; we'd lose it in Philadelphia; we'd
lose it in Atlanta; we'd lose it in Detroit. I think we'd lose
it all over.
You see I've talked too long and I must bring it to a con-
clusion now. Remember that times have changed. They
have changed for the better in many ways. We wrought
significant changes in the '60's, the great Movement did.
We battled down American-style apartheid and relegated
it to the historical scrapheap. The 'For Colored' and 'For
White' signs now crop up in museums where they should
be. But it has changed for the worse in some ways. In
1963, in the Fall — this was after the March in Washing-
ton—public opinion polls showed that more than 75 per-
cent of the American people wanted strong, new civil
rights legislation with teeth in it and wanted to see it en-
forced. This was white, black, north, south, east, west.
They were on our side; we couldn't lose. We had to win; we
had won already because we had swung public opinion to
our side.
But public opinion changed. The back-lash began de-
veloping in the middle '60's. Oh, people were frightened
by Black Power, talk of revolution, by publicity of inner-
city crime, muggings, rapes and murders. They were
frightened by political capital made of the busing issue
and of the welfare chiselers issue; they were frightened by
the summer riots and the riots in the wake of Dr. King's
assassination. Those of lower middle classes were fright-
ened because there was job training for unskilled blacks
and Hispanics and Native Americans with modern tech-
niques and modern equipment, and they feared they were
being trained for their jobs and they thought their jobs
would be in jeopardy and the gains which they had made,
they thought might be lost. Those who have one foot up
the ladder are terrified when there is motion from below
them. So it changed. By the middle '70's, public opinion
polls showed that the majority of the American people
felt, first, that there was no longer any systemic racial dis-
crimination except in reverse, and second, that blacks had
moved too far too fast, had gotten too much too fast. In
the '60's we were victims and popular. Nobody would
have dared have a cocktail party without having at least
one of us there. We were a very popular people then. But
in the '70's and into the '80's, we were viewed more as vic-
timizes, not as victims. We were victims before, victims
of oppression — long suffering, now victimizers. We have
to change that around. We are going to need the alliance,
the friendship, the coalition, the help of all of those of
goodwill. If I may close with the words of Hillel, a Rabbi
of 2,000 years ago: "If I am not for myself, who will be for
me? If I am for myself alone what am I? And if not now,
when?"
From a speech by Mr. Farmer at the University of Massachu-
setts at Boston on March 5, 1986, in the William Monroe Trotter
Institute Distinguished Lecture Series on affirmative action.
The Economic Status
of Blacks
in Boston
by
James E. Blackwell
In recent years, special attention has been given to
problems of racism in Boston. Without question, highly
publicized steps have been taken by civic, business, reli-
gious, and neighborhood groups to combat racism, big-
otry and discrimination. Frequently, these initiatives have
also been supported by municipal and state governments
or administrations. Strategies for improving the racial cli-
mate in Boston, initiated by the Covenant for Racial Jus-
tice, the Boston Committee, the Coalition for a Better
Boston, and now, the newly created PARTNERSHIP, as
well as some pronouncements of the (Mayor) Flynn and
(Governor) Dukakis administrations must be applauded.
However, despite such courses of actions, there is con-
vincing evidence to support the contention that the roots
of racial and ethnic discrimination have not been fully ad-
dressed. Further, there exists a telling discontinuity be-
tween rhetoric and demonstrated success in alleviating
the basic problems of racial discord and race-based exclu-
sion from the social and economic infrastructure of the
Boston community.
In the monograph, The Emerging Black Community of
Boston, 1 I focused on structural barriers and conditions
which either accelerate or impede access and upward mo-
bility of blacks in the occupational structure. This work
offered a description of the general economic conditions
and status of blacks in Boston at mid-1985. The theoreti-
cal underpinnings of the paper were sociological, social-
psychological and economic interpretations of prejudice
and discrimination in the marketplace. Trend data on the
character of that discrimination, the underrepresentation
of blacks in public and private sector employment,
poverty, unemployment, and income — all were obtained
from a variety of sources. The trend data covered a period
from 1979 to mid-1985. Since the publication of this doc-
ument, I have examined additional data, some of which
were generated by the Flynn Administration.
My conclusions remain unchanged! Despite the enor-
mous economic boom currently experienced by the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts and the City of Boston, and
despite some improvements in their status, blacks and
